Abstract-This study presents a novel empirical approach to identify financing constraints for innovation based on the concept of an ideal test (Hall, 2008). Firms were offered a hypothetical payment and asked to choose between alternatives of use. If they selected additional innovation projects, they must have had some unexploited investment opportunities that were not profitable using more costly external finance. We attribute constraints for innovation not only to lacking financing, but also to firms' innovative capability. Econometric results show that financial constraints do not depend on the availability of internal funds per se but that they are driven by innovative capability.
I. Introduction
A widely accepted view in economic research and policy practice is that innovation constitutes an important driving force of firm-level productivity, competitiveness, and sustainable economic growth. 1 Consequently, it is a concern for both policymakers and industry practitioners that financing constraints due to imperfections in capital markets reduce investments in innovation below desired levels. Investment in innovation may be particularly affected by financial constraints since information asymmetries exist due to the complexity, specificity, and high degree of uncertainty of innovation projects. This makes it difficult for outsiders to judge the projects' potential value. Moreover, firms may be reluctant to reveal details of innovation projects to prospect investors. Therefore, financing innovation externally may be more costly compared to other investments. 2 Internal sources of financing are thus crucial for the implementation of innovation projects. 3 However, internal funds are not inexhaustible either. Cash flow is naturally limited, and raising new equity may be costly and often unwanted. 4 Financing constraints may not affect all firms to the same extent. The identification of constrained firms is particularly interesting for policymakers in order to design effective policy schemes aimed at preventing welfare-reducing suboptimal investment in innovation. In contrast to empirical studies that tested the presence of financing constraints indirectly by the sensitivity of investment in R&D to changes in internal funds, this study takes a direct approach. It is based on the concept of an ideal test for identifying financial constraints on investment in innovation as Hall (2008) proposed. She suggests that "the ideal experiment for identifying the effects of liquidity constraints on investment is to give firms additional cash exogenously, and observe whether they pass it on to shareholders or use it for investment and/or R&D. . . . If they choose the second, then the firm must have had some unexploited investment opportunities that were not profitable using more costly external finance." That is, these firms had been financially constrained.
This study contributes to the literature in three main ways. First, we employ a direct indicator derived from survey information. Firms were asked to imagine that they receive additional cash exogenously and indicate how they would spend it. From this we directly observe whether firms choose to invest either all or part of the cash in additional innovation projects. Second, our econometric analysis accounts for the firms' choice between alternative uses of the money. Such an approach is crucial because investing in innovation projects competes with other purposes of firms' available funds. Third, we introduce the concept of innovative capability and how it affects financing constraints for innovation. To the best of our knowledge, this fundamental aspect of a firm's innovation process has attracted little attention in this strand of literature so far.
The econometric results show that financial constraints do not depend on the availability of internal funds per se but are driven by innovative capability through increasing resource requirements. Firms with high innovative capability but low financial resources are most likely to be constrained. Yet we also observe constraints for financially sound firms that may have to put some of their ideas on the shelf. Taking account of all options for using additional money, the multidimensional analysis reveals some further interesting results. For example, firms with bad credit ratings would primarily repay their debt.
Section II briefly reviews previous research. Section III describes the theoretical framework of our study and sets out the role of innovative capability for financing constraints. The data and econometric model specifications, as well the results, are presented in sections IV and V, respectively. Section VI concludes.
II. Financing Constraints for Innovation:
What Do We Know?
In principle there are two sources for financing innovation projects: external sources, which include bank loans or other debt contracts, and internal sources, which basically originate from retained profits or (new) equity. In their seminal article, Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that in markets characterized by no taxes, no bankruptcy costs, and no asymmetric information, investment decisions are indifferent to capital structure. Hence, in a neoclassical world with frictionless markets, sources of financing would not matter. However, starting with the work of Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959) , numerous articles have elaborated the reasons that the source of financing matters and why it particularly matters for investments in innovation (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Stiglitz, 1985; Greenwald, Stiglitz, & Weiss, 1984; Bhattacharya & Ritter, 1983; Anton & Yao, 2002) . Information asymmetries that arise due to the specific characteristics of innovation cause lenders or investors to demand a premium on their required rate of return in the sense of Akerlof (1970) .
Besides information asymmetries, the intangible nature of the asset that is being created by R&D usually makes external fundraising more costly than for other types of investment. A large fraction of innovation investments, particularly R&D, is sunk and cannot be redeployed. Debt holders such as banks prefer physical and redeployable assets as security for their loans since these can be liquidated in case of project failure or bankruptcy (Williamson, 1988; Alderson & Betker, 1996) . Moreover, serving debt requires a stable cash flow, which makes financing of innovation projects by external sources more difficult since most of these projects do not immediately lead to returns. In addition, serving debt reduces cash flow for future investments (see Hall, 1992 Hall, , 2002 . Empirical evidence corroborates that firms first and foremost use internal funds to finance innovation projects (as compared to debt), indicating a gap in the respective cost of capital (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Bhattacharya & Ritter, 1983; Hall, 1990 Hall, , 1992 Himmelberg & Peterson, 1994; Bougheas, Görg, & Strobl, 2003; Czarnitzki & Hottenrott, 2011b) . Internal funds, however, are naturally limited, and raising new equity may be costly and often unwanted. Consequently, the extent to which financial constraints are binding depends on firms' ability to raise funds under the conditions of imperfect capital markets.
Measuring and identifying financial constraints represents a main challenge in empirical research. Since the seminal work of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) , econometric studies have tried to detect financial constraints by analyzing investments' sensitivities to changes in available financial resources, most often cash flow. Excess sensitivities were regarded as indirectly reflecting the firms' lack of access to the credit market. 5 This methodology has subsequently been applied to investment in R&D. Theoretical literature states that asymmetric information, moral hazard in borrower-lendership, intrafirm organizational structure, and other institutional factors may lead to financial constraints. They are thus expected to depend on certain project, firm, and institutional characteristics. In order to observe more than an average effect, researchers usually split their sample or focus on a particular group of firms a priori. 6 Financing constraints for R&D were found to depend on certain project and firm characteristics. Empirical studies, however, have not always provided unambiguous results (see Hall 2002 , and Hall & Lerner, 2010 , for surveys of the literature).
Most of these empirical studies suffer from limitations in data availability. Many of them look at either large stock market firms or exceptionally small firms. More severe limitations arise from the conceptual setup. Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) first questioned whether the relationship between cash flow and investment is a sufficient indication of financial constraints (see also Cleary, 1999 , Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen, 2000 Aydogan, 2003; Moyen, 2004) . Especially in the case of large firms, free cash flow levels may be determined by accounting as well as dividend policies aimed at mitigating moral hazard problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Dhanani, 2005) . Additionally, a positive relationship between investment and cash flow may simply reflect that both of them correlate with promising market demand. Finally, firms tend to smooth R&D spending over time, leading to difficulties in measuring the impact of changes in cash in one period on subsequent investments (Hall, Griliches, & Hausman, 1986; Lach & Schankerman, 1988) .
Consequently, recent studies investigate firms' access to external funds more directly through the analysis of standardized credit ratings (Czarnitzki, 2006; Czarnitzki & Hottenrott, 2011a , 2011b or credit requests (Piga & Atzeni, 2007) . The main concern using credit requests, however, relates to a selectivity problem. The most constrained firms may not expect to get external funding and hence not ask for it. Moreover, in previous studies, firms that have not been innovative in the past due to a constraint may not be paid the necessary attention. As an alternative, Aghion et al. (2008) identify a firm to be constrained if it has failed to repay a trade credit in the previous year. 7 The increased availability of rich and comprehensive survey data on innovation activities at the firm level has enabled researchers to adopt more direct approaches toward the identification of potentially 6 That is, firms are grouped into supposedly more and less constrained firms. The latter are expected to be able to raise funds for any investment. Hence, investment spending should not turn out to be sensitive to the availability of internal funds. In contrast, the former group of potentially constrained firms is expected to show a positive relationship that reveals the existence of liquidity constraints. 7 Using French firm-level data, they show that the share of R&D investment over total investment is countercyclical without credit constraints but is less countercyclical as firms face tighter credit constraints.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
financially constrained firms. 8 They are identified if they report that innovation projects were hampered in some way by the lack of finance. 9 Hajivassiliou and Savignac (2008) employ such a direct survey-based measure and account for simultaneity of financial constraints and innovation. They find that binding financing constraints discourage innovation, and at the same time innovative firms are more likely to face binding constraints.
Traditional investment models as well as survey-based studies suffer from difficulties of distinguishing cash flow shocks from demand shocks. Our empirical approach is aimed at tackling this methodological issue. Moreover, firms simultaneously determine their levels of innovation investment, capital investment, dividends, debt payments, and retentions. That is, the option of investing in innovation competes with alternative uses of funds. We take this into account by performing a five-equation multivariate analysis. Previous studies do not explicitly estimate equations for all these options, although dynamic programming models of investment and financing behavior do implicitly take alternative uses of funds into account. 10 Finally, we explore the role of innovative capabilities for financial constraints that generally have been paid little attention.
III. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
We draw from a simple model by Howe and McFetridge (1976) and David, Hall, and Toole (2000) to explore how innovative capability affects financing constraints for innovation. 11 In this setting, it is assumed that in each planning period, firm i has a certain set of ideas for innovation projects. 12 This set of projects is determined by the firm's innovative capability (IC i ), that is, its ability to generate and pursue new innovation project ideas. The firm ranks these projects according to their expected rate of return in descending order. 13 This results in a downward-sloping demand function (D i ) for innovation financing that reflects the marginal rate of return (MRR i ) of firm i. The marginal rate of return depends on the level of innovation expenditure 8 Innovation surveys are collected in most OECD countries. In Europe they are called the Community Innovation Surveys (CIS). The survey methodology is based on guidelines set out by the Oslo Manual (OECD and Eurostat 2005, first published in 1992) . 9 For studies using this type of indicator, see Canepa and Stoneman (2002) , Savignac (2008) , and Tiwari et al. (2007) .
10 Dynamic programming models determine optimal investment and financing decisions by maximizing firm value (see Auerbach, 1979; Fazzari et al., 1988, and Hall, 1995 , for an extension to R&D). Grabowski and Mueller (1972) and Gugler (2003) simultaneously investigate the determinants of R&D, capital investment and dividends. Guerard, Bean, and Andrews (1987) additionally account for new debt issue.
11 This supply and demand heuristic has also been used by Hubbard (1998) for investments and by Fazzari et al. (1988) and Carpenter and Petersen (2002) to illustrate financing hierarchies for R&D.
12 For simplicity, the projects are assumed to be finely divisible so that the resulting marginal rate of return (MRR) schedule is continuous and continuously differentiable. 13 The expected rate of return is derived from the expected benefits less implementation costs.
(I i ), innovative capability (IC i ), and other firm and industry characteristics (X i ):
Profit-maximizing firm i invests in innovation up to the point where the marginal rate of return equals the marginal cost of capital (MCC i ). MCC i varies with the size of the investment and reflects the opportunity costs of investing funds in innovation. Hence, MCC i also depends on the expected returns to other uses of available funds such as investment in tangible or financial assets (summarized in R e,o i ), as well as on the amount of firms' internal funds (IF i ). In imperfect capital markets, costs of external capital are assumed to be higher than those of internal funds as lenders require a risk premium-for instance, due to information asymmetries. Marginal capital costs are thus also affected by firm characteristics such as creditworthiness (W i ), which depends on collateral as well as capital structure. MCC i increases with the total amount borrowed. Finally, we assume a pecking order: firms draw first on internal funds before resorting to external financing:
Figure 1 illustrates both the demand and the marginal cost function. Equating MRR i and MCC i yields the reduced form for optimal investment (I * i ) in innovation (see Grabowski & Mueller, 1972) :
What happens if additional cash is given exogenously to firms (a shift from MCC to MCC )? Deciding on investment, exogenous cash is not for free due to opportunity costs. If a firm can already fully finance its optimal investment level I * internally, additional cash has no effect on its innovation investment. A finding that the firm does not increase its investment can either indicate that it faced the same capital costs for both funds before (as on perfect capital markets) or that capital markets are imperfect but the firm does not have additional beneficial innovation opportunities (at the given internal cost of capital c int ). In any case, such a firm can be defined as financially unconstrained as it pursues all privately profitable innovation projects at c int (figure 1a). Area A reflects privately nonprofitable innovation potential. 14 If innovation investment is stimulated by exogenous cash flow shocks, we can reject the hypothesis that external and internal capital costs are the same. A positive expansionary effect from additional cash on investment can thus be seen as a result from financing constraints that has curtailed firms' innovation investments at suboptimal levels I (figure 1b). I reflects the innovation investment that is realized with additional cash. Depending Hall (2002) on the amount of cash, it is equal to or smaller than I * , the optimal investment at internal capital costs.
This setting allows us to derive hypotheses about the interplay of innovative capability, financial resources, and financing constraints for innovation. First, we look at innovative capability. Consider two firms A and B; B has a higher innovative capability than A, but otherwise they are identical. We assume a firm to have a higher innovative capability if for each rate of return, it has a larger or equal number of projects at hand. This implies that for each rate of return, the more innovative firm demands a larger or equal additional amount of financial resources. 15 The higher B's innovative capability, the more likely it is that additional cash leads to an expansionary effect (figure 2a). If both firms cannot originally finance their innovation from internal funds alone, additional cash increases the innovation investment of both (figure 2b). The effect, however, is larger for the firm with higher innovative capability if both receive the same amount ΔCASH. This The sum of areas A + A and B + B represents the firms' stock of project ideas that render unprofitable given the rate of borrowing c ext , respectively. Additional cash reduces these costs and thus sets free additional projects (areas A and B ). Second, figure 3a shows how different levels of available internal financing affect the likelihood of financing constraints given a certain innovative capability. Suppose firms A and B have the same innovative capability but different levels of internal funds (IF B > IF A ). Due to lower internal liquidity, firm A is assumed to also face higher costs of external capital than B. This implies that the expansionary effect is stronger for A even with ΔCASH A = ΔCASH B . In addition to internal funds, the slope of the MCC in the nonhorizontal part likewise depends on firm properties that affect the firm's creditworthiness (W i ). For two firms with the same innovative capabilities and comparable levels of internal funds, the expansionary effect is larger for firm A facing the larger gap between c int and c ext (figure 3b). Based on these theoretical considerations, we derive the following hypotheses on financing constraints for innovation activities:
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Hypothesis 1: Given the same level of internal funds, firms with higher innovative capability should be more likely to be constrained than firms with lower innovative capability. Hypothesis 2: Given the same level of innovative capability, firms with lower financial resources should be more likely to be constrained. Hypothesis 3: Firms that face a larger gap between the cost of internal and external capital should be more likely to be financially constrained.
Whether the likelihood of being constrained is larger for firms with low IC and low IF than for firms with high IC and high IF is not clear-cut. It depends on whether lack of internal financing or innovative capability drives financial constraints.
Obviously some of the assumptions of this basic setting are contestable. This particularly concerns the nonmarginal nature of project costs and the information necessary to rank innovation opportunities appropriately. Furthermore, it is assumed that firms always draw on internal funds first. However, firms may pay out the additional cash to shareholders and raise external capital to leverage the risk to lenders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986) . 16
IV. Empirical Implementation
The following analysis makes use of the 2007 wave of the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP). The MIP started in 1993 with the aim of providing representative innovation data for policy and research purposes. It is the German part of the European-Wide Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) and thus provides internationally comparable data. The target population covers all firms with at least five employees in the German business sector. 17 This study focuses on information of 2,468 firms in manufacturing industries. 18 The sample distribution across industries is presented in table A1 in the table appendix.
A. Measuring Financing Constraints
Following the concept of an ideal experiment that Hall (2008) suggested, the survey requested firms to imagine that they receive additional funds amounting to 10% of their previous year's turnover and indicate how they would spend this money. The following response options were given, of which they could choose one or more: (additional) investment projects, (additional) innovation projects, retention/reserves, payout to shareholders, or repayment of debt. In this design, one can estimate the treatment effect by comparing the innovation activities of each firm before and after the cash receipt. In our case, this is measured by whether the firm would also invest in innovation compared to the current situation. A firm is thus considered to be financially constrained if it would invest additional funds in innovation projects (CON = 1, otherwise CON = 0). The conceptual setup allows us to estimate not only the likelihood of being constrained but also the degree to which these constraints affect the firms' innovation 16 An even more ideal test for the degree of financial constraints would be to ask: What would be the amount a firm would invest if capital markets were perfect? If we assume that the marginal costs of capital in case of perfect capital markets are the same as the internal marginal costs of capital in imperfect markets and the amount of additional cash is large enough (exploiting the innovation potential), then the outcome would be the same as above. If the additional cash is not large enough to undertake all beneficial projects, firms would still be constrained. In that case, we would underestimate the expansionary effect. But since we ask only whether they would spend additional cash on the different sources and not how much, our effect goes in the same direction as this more ideal test would go. 17 The survey is conducted annually by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), infas Institut für Sozialforschung, and ISI Fraunhofer Institute on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. A detailed description of the survey data can be found in Peters (2008) . 18 We deleted 630 observations from the original data set due to item nonresponse or outlier correction.
investments. We distinguish three degrees: TYPE = 0/1/2 if the firm indicates that it would not, would partially, or would exclusively invest in additional innovation projects. Thus, TYPE is an ordinal variable that increases the more binding the firm's financial constraints for innovation are. The variables CON and TYPE represent the main dependent variables in our empirical study. Taking into account that innovation competes with other uses, we define a set of binary indicators for each of the alternative response options and estimate a simultaneous multivariate probit model.
The approach presented in this study is obviously different from traditional (R&D) investment equations (see Bond & Van Reenen, 2007 , for a survey). Accelerator and error correction models represent two frequently used approaches. Since cash flow may be correlated with future investment opportunities, the main critique on these reduced-form investment models is that estimated cash flow effects cannot be interpreted without ambiguity. Excess sensitivity tests in structural models, on the other hand, are justified formally as Tobin's q in the popular Q model summarizes all the information about expected future profitability that is relevant for the current investment decision. The Q model, however, requires strong assumptions, and dissatisfaction with the empirical performance has led to the development of structural models such as the Euler equation approach. This approach relaxes some of the assumptions underlying the Q model. It particularly avoids both parameterization of the expectations formation process and the use of share price data. In spite of important theoretical advantages of structural investment models in testing for the presence of financial constraints, the empirical value of Euler equations has been questioned by Bond and Van Reenen (2007) , for example. They argue that the advantage of structural models compared to reducedform models should not be overstated as the former "are based on extreme simplify assumptions, and are frequently rejected when subjected to mild empirical testing" (p. 4422). 19 Our approach attempts to address these concerns by employing a direct constraint measure in a reduced-form regression. We regard the reduced-form as "an empirical approximation to some complex underlying process that has generated the [survey] data" (Bond & Van Reenen, 2007, p. 4443) . Another difference compared to accelerator and error correction models is that the hypothetical exogenous cash increase is, by definition, not driven by future market prospects. Due to the direct measurement of financial constraints, the estimation equation departs from the ones used in accelerator and error correction models. The binary dependent variable CON represents an increase (or no increase) in investment instead of measuring the amount of additional investment. The ordinal dependent variable TYPE contains a bit more information by measuring the degree to which financial constraints affect innovation, that is, whether firms would 
not, would partially, or would exclusively invest the additional cash in innovation. In both cases, the results are thus not directly comparable to traditional investment models.
B. Innovative Capability and Internal Financing
According to our hypotheses, financing constraints are a function of firm liquidity (M ∼ Money) and innovative capability (B ∼ Brain). We distinguish firms that differ in terms of their innovative capability that can be high (B H ) or low (B L ) and their financial resources that can be high (M H ), medium (M M ), or low (M L ). A firm's ability to generate ideas for innovation depends to a large extent on the knowledge capital of its employees, which can be measured through formal qualification levels or knowledge acquired by training. Hence, we use information on the firm's share of highly qualified personnel and its expenditure for training of their employees. A firm is considered to have a high innovative capability (B H ) if either the share of highly qualified personnel or the expenditure on training per employee is larger than the 80th percentile (in 2006). Other studies measure innovative capability also by the firm's R&D expenditure or past innovation success. Because our study also involves firms that are not (yet) engaged in R&D and innovation, we prefer the more general definition above. 20 The profit margin (earnings before taxation as a share of total sales in 2006) is used to measure the availability of internal funds. Originally the profit margin is an ordinal variable with eight categories that we grouped into three dummy variables (see table A2 in the appendix). Firms are assumed to have a low financial endowment (M L ) if the profit margin is smaller than 0. If the ratio is larger than 0 but smaller than 7%, the firm exhibits a medium financial background (M M ). Finally, M H equals 1 if the firm's ratio is at least 7%. By interacting financial resources and innovative capability, we get six groups of firms that differ in their resource endowments (table 1) .
C. Access to External Finance
Being a family-owned company (FAMCOM), that is, the majority of stakes belongs to members of one family, may affect financing conditions. Family-owned firms may have an advantage in external capital cost since they more often have a close and long-established relationship with their house bank; however, recent empirical evidence has shown that family-owned firms tend to avoid dependency on external lenders (Peters & Westerheide, 2011) . Thus, they perceive themselves as constrained and postpone or cancel projects if these projects cannot be funded by internal funds. Capital intensity is measured by the value of firms' tangible assets per employee in 2006 (KAPINT) and reflects firms' overall collateral value. We further complemented our survey data with the firms' credit rating indices that we assume to reflect cost of external capital (RATING). The credit rating is an index between 100 and 600, with 100 representing the best rating. 21 Firms that are part of a company group (GROUP) may benefit from intragroup financing flows that represent an alternative outside-firm financing channel.
D. Control Variables
The derivation of our hypotheses is based on the assumption that the firms differ only in innovation capacity, internal funds, or access to external finance. To take into account that this is not true in the data, we include a set of control variables. Firm age (AGE) is measured in years since founding, and firm size (SIZE) is measured by the number of employees. Since the distributions of SIZE and AGE are highly skewed, we take logs of both variables. Moreover, we include the firms' product life cycle patterns (PLC) because a shorter product life cycle may increase the pressure to develop new products and hence increase the need for resources. Shorter 21 The credit rating index is a standardized measure provided by Creditreform, Germany's largest credit rating agency. product life cycles may also imply shorter periods for generating returns from prior product innovations. We account for the amount of additional funds that firms would receive (CASH) and construct five categories for CASH on the basis of the 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th percentile of the distribution. We further include a regional dummy that indicates whether the firm is located in East Germany (EAST ) to control for regional differences. 22 To take into account the competitive environment of the firm, we employ a Herfindahl index of industry sales concentration published by the German Monopolies Commission (COMP). Finally, we cannot rule out that the job function of the respondent may affect the response. We distinguish among respondents from the general management (CEO), R&D (R&D_DEP), financial (FIN_DEP), sales (SALES_DEP), and other departments (OTHER_DEP).
E. Descriptive Statistics
About 36% of the firms in our sample are financially constrained (see table 2 ). Only 5%, however, would invest the full amount of additional cash in innovation, while the large majority would only partially invest in innovation. In addition, 68% of the firms would allocate at least part of the money to general investments, 44% would pay out the money to shareholders, 21% would retain the cash, and 44% would rather serve debt. When looking at our main covariates of interest, we see that most firms (43%) were classified as having a rather low innovative capability while being in a solid financial situation (B L M M ); 17% of firms with low innovative capability are nevertheless in good financial situation (B L M H ); 33% of all firms were defined as having a high innovative capability; 4% of those firms have a negative profit-turnover ratio (B H M L ); 18% exhibit a solid financial background (B H M M ); and 11% are financially well endowed (B H M H ). The average and median amount of CASH firms would receive is 10.12 million and 611,000 euros, respectively. In the first class, the mean of CASH is about 58,000 euros, in class 2 about 206,600 euros, in class 3 about 645,000 euros, in class 4 about 2.1 million euros, and 47 million euros in class 5. 23 When we look at the firm characteristics of constrained and unconstrained firms, interesting differences can be inferred from the test in differences in means. As expected, constrained firms are less capital intensive, face shorter product life cycles, and are less frequently located in East Germany. At first glance, it is surprising that they are larger, do not differ in terms of age, and have a better credit rating. Moreover, we observe that in the group of constrained firms, the share of firms with high innovative capability is higher. This is valid regardless of their financial background. 24
V. Econometric Analysis

A. Probit and Ordered Probit Models
As shown in section III, the degree of financing constraints y * depends on financial resources M, innovative capability B, other observable firms' characteristics Z, as well as nonobservable factors ε (for simplicity, we suppress firm subscripts i):
Z includes the variables defined in sections IVC and IVD and a set of fourteen industry dummies. Since we do not directly observe the degree of constraint, we first estimate the likelihood of being financially constrained by using a probit model. This can be written as
with the row vector x comprising the interaction terms and Z. According to hypothesis 1 (H1), we expect that β 1 > β 4 , β 2 > β 5 , and β 3 > 0. Furthermore, we expect for firms exhibiting the same innovative capability, like B H , that β 1 > β 2 > β 3 (hypothesis 2, H2). Finally, hypothesis 3 (H3) suggests a positive coefficient of the variable capturing creditworthiness as RATING ranges from 1 to 6, with 6 being the worst rating. Contrarily, capital intensity and group membership should have a negative impact on the likelihood of being constrained. In order to account for heterogeneity and correlation among firms, estimated standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent and clustered by industries and region. In a second step, we proxy the degree of constraints by our categorial variable (TYPE) and estimate ordered probit models. Table 3 provides the estimation results of three different specifications of the probit model on the likelihood of facing financial constraints. Model 1 presents the base specification, including variables for innovative capability and internal finance, as well as control variables. In model 2, we add variables reflecting access to external finance (FAMCOM, GROUP, KAPINT , and RATING). We enhance the specification by including classes for CASH in model 3 (the lowest category serves as the reference category).
The . We test the three inequality relations contained in H1 individually as well using a joint test. The results clearly confirm H1: given the same level of internal funds, firms with a high innovative capability are more likely to be constrained than firms with low innovative capability.
Among firms with high innovative capability, those having low financial resources (B H M L ) are more likely to be constrained than firms that have a solid financial background (B H M M ). Tests confirm that the marginal effect is indeed significantly larger for firms with B H M L . However, hypothesis 2 is only partly confirmed. We do not observe a monotonic relationship as we would have expected. That is, there is no significant difference between firms with B H M M and B H M H . Furthermore, it turns out that firms with low financial resources and low innovative capability (B L M L ) are not more likely to be constrained than firms having a rich financial endowment and low innovative capability. In addition, it was not clear from the theory whether B L M L is more or less constrained than B H M H . The empirical evidence convincingly shows that firms belonging to B H M H have a higher likelihood of facing constraints. Altogether these results imply that innovative capability, and not solely financial resources, drives financing constraints for innovation. Accounting for access to external finance, surprisingly we do not find any robust impact of RATING across specifications. The multivariate probit model will shed some light on this variable in the firm's decision-making process. The variables KAPINT and GROUP show the expected signs. A higher capital intensity significantly reduces the likelihood of facing binding constraints. Being part of a group also exerts a negative, yet insignificant, effect. Family-owned firms seem to be more willing to spend this additional cash on innovation than do non-family-owned firms. These four variables are jointly significant and thus confirm H3. With respect to the control variables, no effects were found for the duration of the product life cycle and firms' age. 25 Finally, we detect differences in response patterns of the financial department and sales managers from those of CEOs and R&D managers. Because the firms receive different amount of hypothetical cash, we include the cash classes in specification 3. The results show that the positive effect of CASH is increasing with the size of the hypothetical payment. The effect doubles from class 3 to class 4 indicating a critical size of the payment of about roughly 1 million euros that significantly increases the likelihood of new innovation projects. Ideally we would like to disentangle size from cash effects. However, CASH is measured as percentage of turnover, and turnover correlates with firm size. Thus, we have to admit that we cannot interpret the effects from CASH as pure cash effects and are furthermore faced with high multicollinearity. Therefore, we leave out CASH in the subsequent models. Finally, it should be noted that we test for normality (Verbeek, 2000) . The test statistics 25 We tested different forms of AGE, such as nonlogged or age classes. Further, we tried nonlinear specifications. AGE did not turn out to be significant in any of these alternative specifications. However, the survey is representative for firms with at least five employees. This implies that a large proportion of very young firms does not belong to the target population.
show that normality cannot be rejected in any of our models (e.g., p-value = 0.473 in model 2 of table 3). Table 4 shows the results of the ordered probit model. The first and second columns present the coefficients and standard errors of the model, and columns 3 to 8 show the marginal effects and standard errors of the likelihood of the different outcomes of TYPE. The ordered model by and large confirms our previous results. 26 Regarding the degree of constraints, firms with a high innovative capability but low financial resources exhibit a likelihood of being constrained in terms of outcome 1 that is 18 percentage points higher than for the reference group. For outcome 2, the effect of 3 percentage points for B H M L may appear small. However, given that only 5% of the firms in the sample would invest the full amount, the effect is comparatively large.
B. Multivariate Probit Model
Certainly firms have to choose among alternatives of use for the money. The decision for each of the alternatives might be influenced by common unobservable factors such as firm-specific interest rates or the risk attitude of managers. Estimating a single-probit equation whether to additionally invest in innovation then provides consistent estimates but a simultaneous estimation that takes into account the full covariance structure is in general more efficient. To account for the rivalry in the use of additional cash, we therefore additionally estimate a five-equation multivariate probit model:
m represents the decisions to invest in physical capital and innovation, build reserves, pay out to shareholders, or repay debts. The variance-covariance matrix Σ has values of 1 on the diagonal due to normalization and correlations ρ jk = ρ kj as off-diagonal elements. The log-likelihood function is then given by
where q im = 2y im − 1. The matrix Ω has values of 1 on the diagonal and ω jk = ω kj = q ij q ik ρ jk for j = k and j, k = 1, . . . , 5 as off-diagonal elements. Φ 5 denotes the joint normal distribution of order 5. The expression for ln L thus involves a five-dimensional integral that does not have a closed form. It can be evaluated numerically through simulation. We employ the maximum simulated likelihood method using the GHK simulator (Geweke, 1989; Hajivassiliou & McFadden, 1998; Keane, 1994 ; for a detailed description of simulation methods, we also refer to Train, 2009) . We use the user-written command cmp in Stata to estimate the multivariate probit model (see Roodman, 2009) . 27 The MSL estimator is consistent if the number of draws R rises with N. It is also efficient if R rises faster than √ N. Furthermore, the simulation bias is negligible when the ratio of the number of draws to √ N is sufficiently large (Hajivassiliou & Ruud, 1994) . We set the number of draws to 2 √ N. The simulation method requires drawing random variables from an upper-truncated normal distribution. We employ draws based on Halton sequences 27 Cmp stands for conditional mixed process. It is a very general command encompassing a broad range of limited dependent variable models, and it allows mixing of these models in multiequation systems. It differs in a few technical aspects from the user-written command mvprobit in Stata. For more details see Roodman (2009) . One virtue of the command is the straightforward calculation of marginal effects. because they are more effective for simulated MSL estimation than pseudo-random draws (Train, 2009) . Table 5 presents the results from the multiequation probit model, and table A3 in the appendix depicts the estimated correlation coefficients. The table reveals significant correlations between most of the error terms, indicating that the equations should indeed be estimated simultaneously. We enrich the specification by including firms' legal form (PUBLIC and LIMITED, PRIVATE serves as the reference category) as it may affect payouts to shareholders, for example. The findings for investing in additional innovation projects remain nearly unchanged. Interestingly, our main variables of interest show a fundamentally different pattern in the decision to invest in physical capital. Having a low innovative capability leads to a higher likelihood of choosing additional investments, the effect being highest for B L M L . Firms with high innovative capability and low financial resources have a lower likelihood of using the additional money for building reserves than other firms. The types of firms that were most likely to invest the additional cash in innovation turn out least likely to build reserves or to pay out cash. The results from equation (4) illustrate that all firms are less likely to distribute the cash to their shareholders than the reference group of firms that have a low innovative capability and rich financial resources. Unlike the choice for innovation, the decision to serve debt is to a large extent driven by the financial background. For both, high and low innovative capability, the likelihood of serving debt rises with decreasing liquidity. That is, we observe the largest effects for B L M L and B H M L . This is in line with the results found for RATING. Firms with a worse RATING have a higher probability of serving debt. These firms seems to give priority to consolidating their financial reputation before investing in new projects. Interestingly, the financial department turns out to be more willing to pay out the cash or to pay back debt than CEOs. Moreover, especially public but also limited firms are more likely to distribute cash to their shareholders while being less likely to reduce debt. Estimates for firms belonging to a group suggest that they are generally less constrained: they are less likely to pursue additional investment projects and have a lower propensity to pay back debts.
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C. Robustness Checks
The previous sections pointed out the important role of innovative capability for financing constraints. Admittedly we cannot observe innovative capability directly. To test the robustness of our results, we employ alternative proxies for innovative capability. First, we measure innovative capability by the same variables but use different cut-off points (mean, median, and 90th percentile of both highly qualified personnel and expenses for training of employees) or measure it relative to the respective industry distribution. The results are robust within a broad range of cut-off definitions, as can be gathered from table A4 in the appendix. Second, we employ three alternative variables to define innovative capability. We begin with using only the share of highly qualified personnel (not accounting for training). Next, we test a stricter definition of innovation-related human capital by using the share of R&D employees. For these two checks, the original 80% cut-off point is applied. Finally, we define innovative capability based on successful innovation projects in the past. More precisely, we observe if the firm has introduced at least one new product to the market in the presurvey period. Table 6 summarizes the results from this exercise for our main variables of interest. Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. As before, we also find β 1 > β 2 . However, support for β 1 > β 3 is given only if we define innovative capability based on past innovation success.
Another concern that may arise is that the results of the quasi-experiment depend on whether a firm was already engaged in innovation activities. We estimate a two-stage selection model for both CON and TYPE. The first stage describes whether the firm has been innovative in the past two years (INNO) . 28 The selection model hinges on at least one valid exclusion restriction. We expect the firms' export intensity (EXINT ) and the diversification of its product portfolio (DIVERS) to affect the likelihood to innovate but not the likelihood of facing financial constraints. Hence, we use both variables as exclusion restriction in the first stage. 29 From table 7 we see that DIVERS and EXINT are significant in stage 1. Furthermore, SIZE, GROUP, and seller concentration (COMP) stimulate innovation, whereas the effect of AGE is negative. However, the likelihood ratio test does not reject the hypothesis of independence of stages 1 and 2. Thus, selectivity does not seem to play a role here. Consequently, the results do not change considerably compared to the models presented in section VA.
Finally, this study made use of a direct indicator of financial constraints. To test whether this indicator really captures what we expect it to do, we conduct an admittedly rough test of the validity of the survey-based constraint indicator (CON). For this purpose, we estimate the sensitivity of firms' actual 28 INNO equals 1 if the firm either had a product or process innovation or has ongoing or abandoned innovation activities in the period [2004] [2005] [2006] and 0 else. 29 Admittedly, we cannot test the validity of the exclusion restrictions; however, it turns out that DIVERS and EXINT were not significant in any regression of financial constraints (CON or TYPE). innovation expenditure (ln (INNOEXP) ) to the availability of internal funds and access to external funds for both the group of potentially constrained (CON = 1) and unconstrained firms (CON = 0). For comparability reasons, we follow Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011a, 2011b) and measure internal liquidity by the empirical price-cost-margin PCM. 30 Access to external funds is proxied by the credit rating index (RATING). We distinguish five rating classes based on the distribution of RATING, each class covering 20% of the distribution. We control for firms' size measured by fixed assets (ASSETS), age of the firm (AGE), market (seller) concentration (COMP), and industry. To avoid direct simultaneity, we use lagged values for all time-variant explanatory variables. 31 We expect a higher sensitivity for firms that were categorized as constrained. This is confirmed by the results (see table 8 ). Innovation expenditure increases significantly with an increase in internal liquidity for group CON = 1 but not for CON = 0. Furthermore, the marginal effects of RATING 3 (only for CON = 1), RATING 4 and RATING 5 turn out to be significantly negative. That is, firms with a worse credit rating spend less on innovation than the firms in the top 20th percentile (which serves as the reference group). Comparing marginal effects across groups, RATING 3 is significantly larger for the constrained group. 32 30 The MIP data used for this study do not provide any information on cash flow. PCM = (Sales − staff cost − material cost + δR&D)/Sales. δ is the labor and material cost share of R&D amounting to 93% according to the official German R&D statistic. 31 We estimate tobit models on the following innovation investment equation, 
VI. Conclusion
Financing conditions for innovation activities in imperfect capital markets may be one reason for welfare-reducing underinvestment in knowledge capital. Firms with limited internal funds may have to leave some of their innovation projects on the shelf due to restricted access to external financing. Such projects would be profitable at the internal rate of return but are not rewarding given the "risk premium" on the cost of external capital.
This article contributes to the literature on financing constraints for innovation in three main aspects. First, a new approach of measuring financial constraints allows us to estimate the likelihood of being constrained, as well as the degree based on a direct indicator derived from a test closer to the "ideal test" as suggested by Hall (2008) . Second, by using multivariate probit models, we take into account that the decision to engage in innovation projects is part of the firms' overall optimization process. Third, we derive a framework that attributes financing constraints not only to the lack of financial resources but also to the firms' innovative capability.
Our econometric analysis supports the hypothesis that financial constraints hold back innovation activities. We find firms with higher innovative capability to be more likely to have unexploited innovation projects, independent of their financial background (hypothesis 1). Our results further show that firms with high innovative capability and low levels of internal funds are more likely to be constrained than their more liquid counterparts (hypothesis 2). In summary, firms with high innovative capability but low financial resources turn out most likely to be constrained.
Is this result surprising as innovation capabilities are necessary to do innovation? It could be argued that firms with high capabilities are able to attract funds more easily because of the higher expected success of their projects. This study, however, suggests the opposite. Investors, although they might be aware of the fact that skills are an important success factor of R&D, do not sufficiently value such skills. Uncertainty about the outcome of innovation projects seems to outweigh information on skills. Firms investing in intangible assets such as human capital instead of physical capital may even experience an additional disadvantage in raising funds due to lower relative collateral value. Hence, financial constraints do not depend on the availability of internal funds per se but are driven by innovative capability.
We further find that low capital intensity has a significant effect on the likelihood and degree of being constrained (hypothesis 3). On the other hand, our main variables of interest play a fundamentally different role in the decision to invest in physical capital. Here, a low innovative capability leads to a higher likelihood of choosing additional capital investments. The multidimensional analysis further reveals that in contrast to the innovation choice, the decision to serve debt is to a large extent driven by financial background. Consequently, firms with low internal funds or poor credit ratings would primarily repay debt instead of investing additional cash in new innovation projects. Another notable result of our study is that family-owned businesses are more likely to invest additional cash in innovation projects than firms with other ownership structures. This may, however, indicate that these firms have a general preference for internal financing. In particular, we expect that family-run businesses would answer differently if loans at a comparatively low interest rate would have been offered instead of cash. Future research will be directed to how much the results depend on the fact that the question offers cash only.
From a policy point of view, we conclude that a significant portion of firms is financially constrained, particularly firms with high innovative capability. Hence, policy should stimulate the provision of risk-taking external capital and provide public funding. If innovative capability is the driving force behind financing constraints, this should be regarded as an important criterion for supporting private investment in innovation. Either project selection or granting tax credits could account for such factors as they reflect the firms' ability to release unexploited innovation potential and turn ideas into innovative products or processes. 
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